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PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACHES TO WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION
An institutional model for rural services
A. Phongsavath and A. Harvey, Lao PDR
In areas where no transmission lines are expected, the organization of affordable and reliable domestic electricity is a 
major challenge. To address this, an institutional model has been piloted in Lao PDR. The model may be relevant to the 
water sector, since there is scope for integration of water and electricity services in rural areas. A key feature of the model 
is that it establishes an incentives framework which attracts private-sector participation in reaching large numbers of 
villages, while also rewarding long-term reliable delivery of service. The financing mechanism motivates villagers to take 
care of equipment. On the national level, the model includes facility for self-finance, and so continuously delivers reliable 
service independently of project funding cycles. 
Background
Provision of rural electrification is one of the goals of the 
National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy endorsed 
by the National Assembly of Lao PDR in January 2004. The 
Power Sector Policy Statement and its action plan issued 
by the MIH in 2003, identifies expansion of off-grid rural 
electrification as a route toward socio-economic benefits and 
improved rural incomes. The Statement calls for a partner-
ship approach, with private sector bodies providing off-grid 
electricity services, while local authorities and other govern-
ment bodies provide regulation and assistance.
The Government of Lao PDR plans to connect most rural 
households to main grid transmission lines over the next fif-
teen years. Since the cost of grid connection is prohibitively 
high in some remote areas, MIH also proposes that some 
10% to 15% of the population (between 100,000 and 150,000 
households) receive improved forms of off-grid supply.   
Improved services
Ad hoc solutions to rural electricity supply exist everywhere 
on a household-by-household basis, as in the use of small 
private hydro generators powered by local irrigation chan-
nels and rivers, or in cases where an entrepreneur charges 
batteries or connects wires from a private diesel generator 
to several houses.
These kinds of solutions are generally expensive, unsafe, 
unreliable, or available only seasonally. Expenditure by vil-
lagers is often in the order of $2 per month or more. Poorer 
households relying on non-electrical lighting from wick-
lamps, typically spend more than $1 per month on fuel, and 
receive a very inadequate standard of illumination.
Improved lighting in rural houses is generally considered 
a major step forward in quality of life. It stimulates better 
health practice (use of mosquito nets, hygiene), increased 
opportunities for education, and evening income-generating 
activities. Use of radios and TVs is often considered a step 
forward in terms of increased knowledge and motivation. 
Day-time electricity supply gives rise to a greater range of 
income generating opportunities. In general, reliable and 
better-quality electricity services are in strong demand from 
rural people.
Incentives for service companies
The MIH strategy is to develop an effective partnership 
between government bodies and private sector service 
companies. To reach 150,000 people in the next fifteen years 
implies 10,000 connections per year. It is quite realistic to 
envision several national, regional or provincial service 
companies sharing this task amongst them. Currently six 
provincial companies are active (Fig 1). These operate under 
an incentive system focused on the quality of the services 
provided, specifically the reliability of the supplies in each 
household over a ten, twenty (or more) year period following 
Figure 1. Six registered companies have signed 
Esco concession agreements. Between them they 
serve 5,000 families in 140 villages (2004)
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the connection. This focus on long-term quality of service 
is supplemented by incentives for expansion of the number 
of connections.
Performance to date
A rapid expansion of volume of service in remote areas car-
ries a high risk of failure of reliability.  To protect against 
this, we have developed a delivery mechanism with the 
following features:
• User choice
• Technical back-up, parts supply network
• Mediation and regulation through tri-partite contracts
• Ownership incentive
• Performance rebates for service providers and media-
tor
By adopting these features we have achieved in the past 
three years a high reliability record, with no payment defaults 
and 3% late payment status. 
The user is a chooser
As a general rule of thumb participation by users in planning 
operations is an essential basis for later sustainability. Escos 
follow a procedure within each village whereby technology 
options and energy resources are surveyed, followed by meet-
ings to discuss each option. The procedure includes careful 
identification by villagers of a suitable individual to act as 
a Village Electricity Manager (VEM), the establishment 
of a mediating committee (VEAC), and the contracting of 
families into financing and service agreements. The user is 
a chooser in another sense also, with individual households 
deciding their preferred level of service. In the case of Village 
Stations (such as a hydro generator), each family registers 
for a certain number of units of supply, and in the case of 
Household Systems (such as solar home systems) they opt 
for different capacities. A one-size-fits-all policy, which has 
been tried in many countries, is rarely effective.
Support chain
Reliability depends also on how effectively the user is sup-
ported with guidance and technical back-up services. As 
shown in figure 2, these are provided by the private sector 
players, the Village Electricity Manager, the provincial 
Esco, and in some cases a regional or national Esco acting 
as an umbrella for provincial Escos. The Village Off-Grid 
Support and Promotion Office (VOPS) provides guidance 
and technical support to the Escos. This back-up is not 
focused purely on hardware maintenance, repair, warranty 
provision, and spare parts supply. It also back-stops the 
financial administration and management capacity of Escos 
and VEMs.
The public-private partnership
The effectiveness of technical and management support de-
pends on the existence of a linked set of clear agreements and 
procedures. Figure 3 shows that contracts are signed between 
private sector implementers together with a third party, the 
government regulator and mediation body.  Responsibili-
ties are defined in these agreements; for example, the staff 
of the Provincial Department of Industry and Handicraft 
(PDIH) have the key role of inspecting and certifying the 
technical standard of installation work carried out by a VEM 
and Esco – this is a regulating role. The Village Electricity 
Advisory Committee (VEAC) has the role of supporting 
the VEM in his tasks of revenue collection; it promotes 
income-generating applications, provides short-term loans 
to families in difficulty, and resolves disputes – the VEAC 
is a mediating body.
Esco activity is licensed and regulated by VOPS and the 
PDIH offices, who have responsibility to demarcate grid 
and off-grid areas, and approve plans. VOPS provides co-
ordination and oversight on behalf of MIH. It progressively 
improves the regulatory framework, ensures fair competition 
to promote efficient Esco practices, provides training and 
technical support to Escos, prepares the tri-partite contracts 
Figure 3. Tri-partite contracts
Figure 2. Technical and management support
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in Figure 3, and oversees their implementation. It works as 
an implementing arm for the MIH program management 
staff and for the Off-Grid Fund Committee (Fig 4). In 
many respects VOPS is a streamlined hybrid public-private 
organization with no more than 4 or 5 consulting staff, 
responding a growing volume of work by continuously out-
sourcing elements of role to regional or national Escos. One 
important aspect of its role is that it works closely with the 
PDIH offices progressively strengthening their role with a 
view to eventual adoption of most aspects of the program 
by provincial governments. 
Technologies
The institutional model described here is effective for many 
village technologies. For example an Esco can introduce a 
solar or diesel powered borehole pump, and arrange for its 
management by a VEM using the hire-purchase financing 
model described below. A village hydro is often combined 
with irrigation channels and clean water piping. In general we 
classify schemes of this sort as Village Stations to distinguish 
them from Household Systems or technologies involving 
installation of hardware for individual family use Examples 
could be a family rain catchment tank, purifier, or water sup-
ply pipe – conceivably these could be organized in a manner 
similar to that described here for solar home systems.
Financing models
In the case of solar home system (SHS) dissemination, the 
contractual arrangements mentioned above are open to either 
rental (“fee-for-service”) or hire-purchase (“rent-to-buy”) 
financing models. Under fee-for-service, the consumer 
pays monthly fees for use of electricity generated by in-
stalled equipment, while a provincial or national company 
maintains the equipment at no extra cost to the consumer. 
Hire-purchase involves two phases. The first is a rental 
period in which maintenance support is provided on less 
favorable terms - spare parts and expertise for repairs are 
available in the village on the basis of a Village Electricity 
Manager earning a portion of rental payments, but the user 
must pay the costs of repairs after a warranty period has 
expired. The second phase is ownership; if all rental pay-
ments are made, the user becomes an owner. He is not left 
without expert support, as the VEM is still available to do 
repairs and supply spare parts, having by then established 
an income from this work.
Under the MIH program design only minor modifications 
to paper work are needed to allow Escos, VEMs, and users 
to choose one or other of these systems, and it is possible for 
rental to be applied in some areas and rent-to-buy in others. 
This variegated approach may occur in future years, if for 
instance rental is found to be a valid method of reaching 
more remote or more cash-poor villages. 
Comparing the models
During field trials of SHS in 1999 and 2000 service fees 
were found to have significant risk of unreliability. The 
customers would sometimes announce their intention to 
refuse fees due to situations such as temporary absence of 
the trained service technician or some form of dissatisfac-
tion with service. It became apparent that frequent refusals 
could become a norm. In contrast the pilot trails indicated 
strongly that users were happy with payments leading over 
5 or 10 years to ownership 
In general for SHS, fee-for-service can result in careless 
handling and deterioration of equipment, since users carry 
little responsibility for repair. 
On the other hand the incentive of prospective or actual 
ownership by villagers is simple and effective in ensuring 
equipment is looked after. Village station managers appre-
Photo 1. Village hydro systems are usually integrated 
with irrigation channels and clean water supply
Photo 2. Solar home systems are popular in Laos. 
Sizes available under the MIH program are 20W, 30W, 
40W and 50W. 
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ciate the need to maintain the hardware in good working 
order as their income depends on it. Equally, a SHS owner 
(prospective or actual) is concerned to maintain the asset 
of a durable solar panel in good condition both as sale-able 
asset and as a source of electricity. 
The dissemination of SHS panels ownership to rural 
families strengthens their economic security , since they 
can use the resale value of their panel as protection against 
financial  emergencies. Indeed the rent-to-buy or hire-pur-
chase model acts as important poverty-alleviation mechanism 
in this regard.
Tariff with HP
When applied to Village Stations, the two models are com-
bined. In this case the VEM obtains the equipment by hire-
purchase, while he is covering his costs through collection 
of tariff payments (or fees-for-service) from his customers. 
Figure 4 illustrates this arrangement. Household systems are 
organized a little differently, with hire-purchase repayments 
coming from the consumers themselves.
National price guidelines
A key feature of MIH’s role in disseminating off-grid elec-
tricity service is that it is promulgating nationally a simple 
pricing guideline for both Village Stations and Household 
systems. An example is given for SHS on Table 1 where 
down-payments and monthly payments are listed. Although 
this raises questions about affordability in specially cash-poor 
areas, it does have the effect of eliciting a consensus for good 
behavior; if everyone is paying the same, there is not much 
excuse for defaulting. This discipline is enhanced by setting 
the hire-purchase price to reflect the nominal face-value of 
the hardware procurement, delivery and commissioning cost 
(for example in the 30 watt case, the consumer can see he 
is paying about $200 for equipment costing about $200). 
Although the customer may be aware this is artificial in being 
free of interest and of commercial mark-ups, it is nevertheless 
a proper purchase from a commercial company at a proper 
price, rather than a hand-out. This engenders pride on the 
part of the consumer and discipline in satisfying the com-
mercial company’s payment expectations. It is likely that we 
will find that the prices set at present will not be affordable 
for more than about 70% of the rural population, so a ques-
tion will be raised as to reaching the final 30%. Our prices 
approximately reflect current expenditure on electricity by 
about 50% of the rural population on electricity (pico-hydros, 
battery charging, purchase of dry cells). One question in the 
Figure 4. Village stations
Tariffs
HP monthly
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Table 1. Approximate SHS prices and face-value subsidies (kip represented as dollars)
10W 20W 30W 40W 50W
Commissioning cost (hardware cost,
planning and post-installation rebates) 78 137 195 253 311
Operational rebates over 10 years 84 84 84 84 84
Approx replacement parts over 10 years 100 100 100 100 100
Cost
Total cost 262 321 379 437 495
Down-payment 13 16 19 22 25
Hire-purchase dues per month 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Hire-purchase payments over 10 years 60 120 180 240 300
Approx replacement parts over 10 years 100 100 100 100 100
Consumer
pays
Total consumer payment 173 236 299 362 425
Shortfall 89 85 80 75 70
Subsidy
Percentage face-value subsidy 34% 26% 21% 17% 14%
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future will be, would increased subsidies in special areas 
or for the most marginalized members of a village, lead to 
dissatisfaction by mainstream consumers.  It will probably 
be important to maintain a national price guideline which is 
followed by everyone, and make adjustments in other vari-
ables. This may be possible through new techniques such as 
introduction of income-generation and electricity packages, 
or possibly water and electricity packages.
Expansion incentives
Many rural services involve installation of expensive 
hardware in remote villages; water pumps, pipes, purifiers, 
electricity generators are examples. If the hardware is to 
work properly over many years, expensive travel by experts 
to each village is needed, to match design specifications to 
local conditions, to set up adequate organizational capacity, 
and to install equipment correctly.
The program prescribes procedures for Escos to follow 
when they make initial planning visits in which systems are 
set up, and electricity consumers registered. To encourage 
the Escos to to apply these proficiently, a payment is made 
by VOPS for each consumer registered, on receipt of Cluster 
Plans if the plans demonstrate full compliance with procedure 
for a group of villages. This planning rebate is considered one 
of the Commissioning Costs of the rural service. In principle 
it is withdrawn once the Esco gathers sufficient customers 
and financial reserves to allow it to submit correct planning 
documents as its own investment.  
The test of the quality of the planning, installation, and 
organizational set-up is not immediate but many months 
after installation. The MIH program offers Escos a “post-
installation” rebate which is paid pro-rata to the number of 
working service connections, on condition of full and accurate 
reporting of conditions within the village during the first six 
months after installation. The Escos also receive a smaller 
rebate on consumer payments made at time of installation.
Figure 5. Reserve fund for sustainability
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A brief summary of the main expansion incentives in-
cludes:
• Planning rebate (withdrawn once the Esco is large)
• Installation and post-installation rebates
• Parts supply margins
VEMs also benefit form post-installation rebates, to make 
sure that in the first six months they are motivated to follow 
procedures and adopt good practice.  Expansion rebates 
may be applied in the future as performance incentives for 
VOPS. 
Reliability incentives
The various incentives for sound operation so far discussed 
are user choice, technical and management support, mediation 
and regulation through tri-partite contracts, and prospective 
and actual ownership. A further reliability incentive is built 
into the MIH delivery mechanism: the operational rebate, 
as shown on Fig 4.
For each hire-purchase repayment correctly deposited in 
the government’s cost recovery account, the VEAC, VEM, 
and Esco can claim a rebate sum. This means that good 
planning (good choice of VEM), good installation, good 
customer relations, good mediation, preventive maintenance 
practices, advance stocking of spare parts, good training of 
implementers, and any techniques aimed at reliable electric-
ity supply, are rewarded. This principle is to be extended 
to administrative cost rebates for PDIH offices, and for 
performance linking the remuneration of VOPs. 
Figure 5 shows how the bodies engaged in off-grid delivery 
are motivated by both expansion and reliability incentives, 
amongst which are the rebates. The question as to whether 
reliability can be maintained as the program seeks to up-scale 
to 10,000 connections a year is still open; clearly the devel-
opment banks and aid agencies must be convinced of this if 
larger inflows of soft credit or grants are to be available. The 
figure helps by showing an anatomy of the mechanism, and 
reminding the regulators that any increase in expansion rates 
must be balanced by a health-check on reliability. As time 
goes on increasing attention will need to be paid to practical 
application of the mechanisms assuring reliability.
Sustainability
For rural services to work every day, the support structure 
must be financed every day. This means in our case the 
VEM, VEAC, Esco, and oversight team VOPS, must have 
a secure source of income. Revenues from users are  regu-
lar and easily accessible. Figure 4 shows these are used to 
fund the operational rebates, but these rebates will not by 
themselves keep the players in business for more than a few 
months. Clearly expansion is necessary to keep the players 
on the field and this is mainly funded by soft loan. The 
difficulty is that loans and project cycles stop and start, as 
indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 5.  One solution is 
for the government to define its own continuous program. It 
would then attract finance packages from different sources 
and arrange their timing to overlap so that the net effect is 
a continuous inflow. 
Another solution is to develop internal reserve funds which 
are used to immediately fill gaps appearing between external 
project cycles and soft credit tranches. In Figure 5, it is clear 
that funds in the reserve can be triggered into action at any 
time that external funding inflow suffers a dip.
MIH is adopting both the above approaches for the vil-
lage off-grid program, and is now instituting an Off-Grid 
Promotion Fund (OPF) to accumulate finance and to act as 
a focus for effective governance of the program. This fund 
is expected to evolve into a wider Rural Electrification Fund 
in due course. 
From the point of view of Escos, an exclusive concentra-
tion on electricity services as such is not necessarily the best 
thing. Diversification into a range of rural services, including 
water services, promises a rationalization of costs. 
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